Animals as moral agents.

Greetings, loyal minions. Your Maximum Leader has been reading the ongoing discussion about animal ethics between Keith Burgess-Jackson and our very own Minister of Agriculture. Today's recent post by Dr. Burgess-Jackson starts to address the one part of the argument that your Maximum Leader believes has not yet been sufficently addressed. That question is this: "How does one determine that an animal is a moral agent on par with a human being?"

The good doctor begins to address your Maximum Leader's question in this passage: (NB: emphasis mine)

But animals have futures that contain activities, enjoyments, and experiences, although perhaps not projects in the strict sense. Their lives are the preconditions for these things. Without their lives, these things cannot exist. Even a painless killing deprives an animal of these valued things.

The cases are parallel. You might object that humans and animals are different. Of course they're different. But are the differences morally relevant? Humans differ among themselves, but not all the differences are morally relevant. We don't let skin color, for example, affect one's rights. Why is species membership morally relevant? How could it be, since it's a biological concept? Species is no more relevant than race is, and you don't think race is relevant.

It is on this point that your Maximum Leader will differ with the good Doctor. Species membership is the crux of the moral issue. Biological differences may be the root of our discussion. Skin colour (race) is not an important factor in this discussion, and a bad analogy. Members of the same species will have variation within that species. But between species differences become more important.

Your Maximum Leader believes that in order to treat animals as moral agents on par with humans, they (animals) would have to demonstrate that they are capable of moral action, like humans.

This is an interesting point, and one on which your Maximum Leader will give more thought.

Carry on.